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Liberal Self-determination, Postcolonial Statehood,  
and Minorities: The Chittagong Hill Tracts in Context 
Mohammad Shahabuddin* 
Abstract: The post-WWII phase of international law was indeed set for 
reaffirming faith in certain crucial values: fundamental human rights, 
dignity and worth of individuals, equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small, among others. In this new era, however, 
progression equated to liberal values, and universalism simply meant the 
expansion of these values at a global scale. This ideological shift towards 
liberalism was soon reflected on the periphery with the emergence of new 
States in Africa and Asia which demonstrated preoccupation with nation-
building, and as a consequence, with assimilationist projects. Against the 
backdrop of the right to self-determination and with the case of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, this paper argues the manner in 
which the liberal West portrays ethnicity as primitiveness has deeply 
rooted implications for the way in which this image of ethnicity is then 
projected on the ‘global other’ – the periphery – wherein the process of 
constructing the nationhood in light of the liberal world view engenders 
detrimental consequences for minorities – the ‘local other’ within a given 
polity. 
Introduction 
This paper is premised on the argument that the ethnic dichotomy of ‘self’ and 
‘other’ has informed the manner in which international law engaged with the 
major events of each of its developmental phases.1 This proposition, on the one 
hand, is informed by the postcolonial legal scholarship, but on the other, 
attempts to break the silence on ‘ethnicity’ in the international law of this genre. 
Against the backdrop of the discourse on self-determination and with the case of 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), in this paper I argue that the manner in which 
the liberal West portrays ethnicity as primitiveness2 has deeply rooted 
implications for the way in which this image of ethnicity is then projected on the 
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‘global other’ – the periphery – wherein the process of constructing the 
nationhood in light of the liberal world view engenders detrimental 
consequences for minorities – the ‘local other’ within a given polity. The paper 
substantiates this claim by first responding to the following questions: How the 
construction of statehood in the postcolonial world was informed by the post-
WWII liberal international legal order? What normative position did minorities 
acquire in the liberal nation building projects? And finally, what are the 
normative and pragmatic implications of such a legal regime for the viable 
accommodation of minority rights? This normative discussion is then followed 
by the example of the legal status of ethnic minorities under the ‘liberal’ 
constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh, which was drawn along the 
line of the post-WWII international human rights instruments. 
The Paradigm Shift: from ‘ethnic’ to the liberal notion of self-determination 
The emergence of nationalism in the nineteenth century was closely associated 
with war.  For nineteenth-century thinkers, war was the necessary dialectic in the 
evolution of nations. Frequent outbreaks of war and ensuing re-drawing of State-
territories gave birth to fresh minority problems in Europe. States pursued the 
goal of establishing nation-States; but in reality, what they ended up with were 
multi-nation States, and in the same process, a number of nations such as the 
Germans turned into multi-State nations. The Peace Conference following the 
Great War aggravated the minority issue by drastically redrawing the frontiers in 
Eastern and Central Europe that followed the collapse of the old Empires. In the 
aftermath of the War, international law had to respond to this minority ‘problem’ 
against the backdrop of the most influential notion of the time – self-
determination. 
In his famous Fourteen Points, Wilson enshrined the notion of self-
determination, without actually using the term, as one of the key guiding 
principles of the post-War international order.3 In the aftermath of the War, his 
first draft of the Covenant categorically mentioned in Article III the principle of 
self-determination along with the provision of certain territorial adjustments 
which was to qualify the mutual guarantee of political independence and 
territorial integrity among the contracting Powers.4 
However, Wilsonian proposition of self-determination, being premised on the 
centrality of ethnicity in the political organisation of nation-States, faced criticism 
from even other American delegates as it transpired that the territorial 
adjustments made at the Paris Peace Conference were unlikely to satisfy all 
nationalist claims, and therefore, to prevent ethnic tensions to erupt. David 
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Miller – an American jurist and also one of the draftsmen of the Covenant – in his 
comment on Wilson’s draft asserted that such a general provision of self-
determination “will make that dissatisfaction permanent, will compel every 
Power to engage in propaganda and will legalise irredentist agitation in at least 
all of Eastern Europe”.5 
Miller was not alone in criticising Wilson’s proposition. It is evident from the US 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing’s personal narrative of the peace negotiations 
in Paris that he was extremely critical of the idea of self-determination as a 
general principle, let alone as a right.6 Although faced with vehement opposition 
from other statesmen Wilson dropped the idea of self-determination in his fourth 
draft and also in the Covenant, Lansing found it regrettable that such opposition 
did not obtain from Wilson an open disavowal of the principle as the standard 
for the determination of sovereign authority; hence, the phrase remained one of 
the general bases for peace negotiation.7 
Perhaps, Wilson himself was aware of the limitations of his policy of self-
determination expressed along the ethnic line, and therefore, he had to deviate 
from this principle on a number of occasions. In a note written on December 30, 
1918, Lansing  claims that in the actual application of the principle Wilson rather 
relied on a number of exceptions to his own creation: millions of ethnic Germans 
were denied the right to self-determination and transferred to the new States of 
Poland and Czecho-Slovakia under the Treaty of Versailles; Austrian Tyrol was 
ceded to the Kingdom of Italy against the will of substantially the entire 
population of that region under the Treaty of Saint-Germain; Austria was denied 
the right to form a political union with Germany; the peoples of Esthonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaidjan were left to the mercy of Great 
Russia despite their distinct identities and aspirations to become independent 
States.8  
Such deviations from the principle of self-determination, so far as the German 
minorities were concerned, were quite obvious. The application of the principle 
of self-determination otherwise could have meant the unification of Germany.9 In 
fact, following the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in October 1918, the prewar 
representatives of the German territories of Austria-Hungary passed a draft 
constitution which declared that “Germany-Austria is a component part of the 
German Republic.”10 It was difficult for the victors of the War to see Germany 
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pocket the benefit of their victory; “the Entente Powers had not really fought for 
four years merely to preside over the expansion of Germany.”11 Thus, deviating 
from the principle of self-determination, the Treaty of Versailles insisted on the 
establishment of an independent Austria, wherein ethnic Germans were a 
majority. Later, the Permanent Court in an Advisory Opinion declared the 
customs union between Austria and Germany violative of the Article 88 of the 
Treaty of Saint-Germain and Protocol No. 1 signed at Geneva on October 4, 1922 
that stipulated continuation of Austria as an independent State.12 Additionally, 
Germany had to cede territories inhabited by ethnic Germans. The Versailles 
arrangement handed over 1.2 million Germans to Poland, 3.5 million to 
Czechoslovakia, 550,000 to Hungary, 250,000 to Italy, 800,000 to Romania, 
700,000 to Yugoslavia, and 220,000 to the Baltic States; it had turned Germans 
into the largest minority population in Europe.13  
However, during the peace negotiations, efforts were made to reconcile the 
classical notion of sovereignty and the ethnic notion of self-determination. As 
Miller asserted, since the principle of self-determination could not be generally 
applied, 
[i]t is submitted that the contrary principle should prevail; as the 
drawing of boundaries according to racial or social conditions is in many 
cases an impossibility, protection of the rights of minorities and 
acceptance of such protection by the minorities constitute the only basis of 
enduring peace.14 
Thus, on the one hand, instead of Wilson’s initial proposal of incorporating self-
determination as a general principle, an unqualified guarantee of political 
independence and territorial integrity of all State members of the League was 
stipulated, and on the other hand, the nationalities within the new States, which 
were not granted the right to self-determination due to pragmatic or strategic 
reasons, were put under an international mechanism of minority protection. In 
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other words, the notion of the protection of minorities appeared as a fallback 
position where the principle of self-determination in ‘ethnic’ sense could not be 
applied. 
While in the interwar period, the notion of self-determination was closely 
associated with the minority protection regime, in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the idea of self-determination was primarily expressed through 
decolonisation. In fact, as Rosalyn Higgins demonstrates, much before the claim 
for decolonisation gained prominence in the discourse on self-determination, the 
mention of self-determination in the UN Charter simply meant equal rights of all 
States to non-interference in their internal affairs.15 It was only through the 
activism of the new States of Asia and Africa in the General Assembly that the 
concept of self-determination turned into the moral and legal force behind 
decolonisation.16 However, at the same time these new States were aware of the 
potential danger of promoting an ethnicity-defined version of self-determination 
that would engender the fragmentation of the Asian and African States; hence, 
they preferred to rely on the principle of uti possidetis that helped peaceful 
decolonisation process in Latin America between the late eighteenth century and 
the early nineteenth century.17 
Thomas Franck sees this pattern as a reconciliatory move; in his words: “The 
disintegration of Spanish imperialism in America produced the norm of uti 
possidetis. The end of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires [in the 
interwar period] gave rise to self-determination. In the post-1945 era uti possidetis 
and self-determination were redefined and synthesised into a doctrine of 
decolonisation.”18 While the ethnic notion of self-determination in the Paris Peace 
Conference attempted to undo established borders in order to create States along 
ethnic lines, the principle of uti possidetis cemented the territorial borders 
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arbitrarily drawn by the colonial Powers19 and endorsed the multi-ethnic 
composition of the postcolonial States.20 It is this drastic ideological shift from the 
conservative ‘ethnic’ to the liberal ‘territorial’ notion of statehood in post-WWII 
international law that we underscore in this paper in relation to minorities in 
postcolonial States.             
Projection of the Liberal Image of Ethnicity on the Global ‘Other’ 
The interwar arrangement of minority protection was already in decline some 
years prior to the outbreak of WWII and there was no enthusiasm for its 
continuation.21 Given the discriminatory character of the minority protection 
regime as well as the political maneuvering of the minority issue by Nazi 
Germany, the idea of the protection of minorities under the League became an 
easy victim of the widespread criticism following WWII. However, Humphrey 
notes that there were deeper reasons for the change in attitude towards 
minorities: first, the shift in political power and influence from Europe to the 
United States, which itself was a country of immigration; and second, the 
emergence of the new countries in Africa and Asia, which demonstrated a 
preoccupation with nation-building and consequently with assimilationist 
projects.22 
The post-WWII phase of international law was indeed set for reaffirming faith in 
and promoting certain crucial values: fundamental human rights, dignity and 
worth of individuals, equal rights of men and women and of nations large and 
small, among others.23 In this new era, however, ‘progress’ equated to liberal 
values, and universalism simply meant the imposition of these values at a global 
scale. Thus, since the inception of the UN, an individualist notion of human 
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rights has become the dominant vocabulary through which the concept of 
‘minority’ is expressed. While the minority protection regime under the League 
was of a hybrid nature – incorporating both collective and individual rights, 
under the new arrangement in the post-WWII context, it appeared convincing to 
replace the minority protection system with the human rights regime exclusively 
centred on the universal protection of individual rights. 
The rationale for this shift is given in a study by the United Nations Secretariat in 
1950 that concludes: 
If the problem is regarded as a whole, there can be no doubt that the 
whole minorities protection regime was in 1919 an integral part of the 
system established to regulate the outcome of the First World War and 
create an international organisation, the League of Nations. One 
principle of that system was that certain States and certain States only 
(chiefly States that had been newly reconstituted or considerably 
enlarged) should be subject to obligations and international control in 
the matter of minorities. But this whole system was overthrown by the 
Second World War. All the international decisions reached since 1944 
have been inspired by a different philosophy. The idea of general and 
universal protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is 
emerging. It is therefore no longer only the minorities in certain 
countries which receive protection, but all human beings in all countries 
who receive a certain measure of international protection.24 
The then US Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, in an address delivered at 
the commencement exercises at the College of Negroes, Durham on May 31, 1943 
justified this move towards the human rights regime by raising an ‘ethical’ 
question: “[I]n the kind of world for which we fight, there must cease to exist any 
need for the use of that accursed term ‘racial or religious minority’. […] is it 
conceivable that the peoples of the United Nations can consent to the 
reestablishment of any system where human beings will still be regarded as 
belonging to such ‘minorities’?”25 This ideological shift was well sketched by 
Joseph Kunz in 1954 when he wrote about the changing pattern of international 
law: 
He who dedicates his life to the study of international law in these 
troubled times is sometimes stuck by the appearance as if there were 
fashions in international law just as neckties. At the end of the First 
World War, ‘international protection of minorities’ was the great fashion 
[…]. Recently this fashion has become nearly obsolete. Today the well-
                                                          
24  United Nations, Study of the Legal Validity of the Undertakings Concerning Minorities 
(1950), UN Doc E/CN4/367. 
25  US Department of State, US Department of State Bulletin, VIII, no. 206 (June 5, 1943), 
482.  
Jahangirnagar University Journal of Law, Vol. 1, June, 2013 
84 
dressed international lawyer wears ‘human rights’.26 
Unlike the short-lived regime of minority rights, this new era of individualist 
human rights, however, looked permanent, albeit, with a certain degree of 
ambivalence.  
The Colonial Declaration of 1960, thus, not only reinforced the colonial borders 
in Asia and Africa, but also indicated the manner in which the postcolonial States 
would be constructed on the basis of fundamental human rights.27 Subsequent 
General Assembly Resolutions as well as the decisions of the International Court 
of Justice also unequivocally declared the primacy of territorial integrity of States 
over the ethnic claim of self-determination.28 It is against this backdrop that the 
legal architecture in the postcolonial States was essentially premised on the 
liberal international legal norms. As we shall see soon, the specific provisions of 
individual equality and individual freedoms coupled with the homogenous 
nation-building project not only alienated ethnic minority groups, but also 
provided justifications for their assimilation into the dominant State-sponsored 
culture.  
The Fallacy of Human Rights Approach to the Minority ‘Problem’ 
From a communitarian perspective, the shortcoming of the liberal-individualist 
human rights regime in accommodating the ethnic group phenomenon within its 
individualist framework is inherent. The veteran communitarian, Vernon Van 
Dyke, presents a historical account of how liberal political theorists like Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau eliminated any political identity between State and 
individuals.29 He finds the same phenomenon in the work of Rawls who puts 
individuals in the ‘original positions’ while explaining how rational individuals 
historically agreed to the principles of justice in a social-contractarian fashion.30 
In contrast, Van Dyke finds historic precedents and contemporary practices that 
stand against this liberal individualistic position; the establishment of the State 
itself is one such great historic precedence. In his words: 
[T]he notion that all individuals somehow consent to the jurisdiction of 
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the state is an obvious fiction. A more tenable position […] is that human 
needs exist at various levels […], and that the existence of needs implies 
a right to meet them […]. This principle justifies individual rights, and it 
also justifies the rights of communities, including the communities (or 
the communities of communities) that constitute states. At no level are 
the rights absolute. At each level and between levels, rights and their 
exercise are limited by other rights. Within limits reached after 
considering the relevant rights, the meeting of the needs of community – 
or the promotion of the good of the community – justifies restrictions on 
the behaviour of individuals, whether they consent or not.31        
His argument for group rights has its base on two assumptions: first, 
communities have rights as separate units, and in some cases, these rights are not 
reducible to the rights of individuals as members, and second, these rights may 
reflect moral claims. He exemplified the first assumption with the British practice 
in many of her colonies where the British administration conferred legal rights to 
communities – an arrangement which is “obviously communal, giving land 
rights to the community as such on a collective, corporate basis. To seek to 
reduce these communal rights to individual rights is to strain to preserve a 
paradigm that does not fit.”32  
While defending his second assumption that rights, which ought to be accorded 
to groups, should also be thought of as reflecting moral claims, Van Dyke 
questions: “Why should the possibility be ruled out that the authority of the state 
should be limited not only by the moral rights of individuals (“inalienable” or 
human rights), but also by the moral rights of groups?”33 He asserts that legal 
status and rights, including the right to self-determination, may well be granted 
to groups in response to moral claims, given that often such group rights are not 
conflicting with individual rights. To quote him:  
There is never a thought that when a people exercise its right to self-
determination, the outcome might violate an individual right. No 
violation occurs even in the case of those who oppose the outcome. They 
retain the right to leave the group, but they have no right of protection 
against the group’s decision, and no right of redress. […] The foregoing 
suggests that it is the corporate unit that enjoys the right; the most that 
an individual can claim is a right to participate in the corporate choice.34  
In a different work, he attempts to dismantle the liberal approach to the right to 
self-determination with the contention that although individuals have interest in 
being grouped, that does not necessarily mean that the related right goes to 
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individuals.35 
Van Dyke portrays the inherent drawback of liberalism in accommodating group 
rights with reference to the liberal response to indigenous communities. On the 
one hand, liberals acknowledge rights for persons belonging to indigenous 
communities, on the other hand, history shows that the indigenous communities 
are as a rule not capable of upholding either their rights or their interests in free 
and open individualistic competition with their more advanced counterparts. In 
his worlds:  
[T]he liberal, moved by human concerns, has to favour some kind of a 
special, protective regime for [indigenous people] – perhaps establishing 
territorial reserves from which others are excluded. But this is contrary 
to liberal doctrine, which is at least integrationist if not assimilationist; 
permanent communalism is unacceptable. And so the liberal is torn. 
What he usually does is to say that the special measures for the 
indigenous are transitory, pending developments that permit 
integration. But if independence is impractical, permanent communalism 
may be exactly what the indigenous want […] 
The trouble is that the liberal has no place in his theory for peoples as 
distinct political units within the state. Individuals are the units, and 
when individuals are divided up for governmental purposes, it must be 
on a territorial basis and not on the basis of ethnic differences […] There 
seems to be no place in the liberal’s thought for the possibility that an 
indigenous population might want to preserve its distinctive identity 
indefinitely.36 
Thus, the way liberalism tends to respond to group identities is very often 
disproved by practice. This gap between theory and practice, in communitarian 
understanding, marks the inherent drawback of liberal-individualism. And this 
is exactly where communitarians take a solid stand by asserting that 
individualism alone cannot be a proper response to minority rights; hence the 
obvious conclusion as drawn by Van Dyke is that “liberalism needs 
supplementing”.37 The proposed supplement is to recognize ethnic group rights 
going beyond the traditional liberal-individualist notion of human rights. 
Consequently, on the one hand, in the face of theoretical limitations of liberal-
individualism, a distinct set of principles recognizing group rights is advocated 
by the supporters of minority rights regime, on the other hand, pragmatic 
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practices of group differentiated rights strike at the very root of the liberal theory. 
This exposes a move towards reconciling the liberal fantasy of a post-ethnic 
world with crude pragmatism that often makes ethnic accommodation obvious. 
As a matter of fact, the post-Cold War ethnic violence had facilitated a fresh 
discourse on the necessity of ethnic accommodation within liberal political 
philosophy itself. Indeed, there is a hope for a more accommodative international 
law in the ‘liberal’ proposition that individual and group rights are not mutually 
exclusive and it is possible to accommodate group rights within the liberal 
framework. The proponents of this argument – Yael Tamir, Joseph Raz, and Will 
Kymlicka, among others – acknowledge that there are compelling interests 
related to culture and identity, which are fully consistent with the liberal 
principles of individual freedom and equality, and which justify granting special 
rights to minorities.38 
Kymlicka famously advanced his theory of liberal culturalism which is based on 
the fact that the modern States invariably develop and consolidate a ‘societal 
culture’ which requires the standardisation and diffusion of a common language, 
and the creation and diffusion of a common educational, political, and legal 
institutions.39 These societal cultures are profoundly important to liberalism as 
liberal values of freedom and equality must be defined and understood in 
relation to such societal cultures. Therefore, in his theory, while freedom and 
equality for immigrants require freedom and equality within mainstream 
institutions by promoting linguistic and institutional integration as well as by 
reforming those common institutions so that linguistic and institutional 
integration does not require denial of their ethno-cultural identities, freedom and 
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equality for the ‘national minorities’ requires something more.40 Given that these 
groups already possessed a societal culture and they have fought to maintain 
these institutions, Kymlicka argues, their demands for special language rights 
and regional autonomy have increasingly been accepted by liberal democracies. 
He then contends that group-differentiated treatment of this sort is not a 
violation of liberal principles, for to expect the members of national minorities to 
integrate into the institutions of the dominant culture is neither necessary nor 
fair. Freedom for them involves the ability to live and work in their own societal 
culture. In short, the aim of the liberal theory of minority rights is to define fair 
terms of integration for immigrants, and to enable national minorities to 
maintain themselves as distinct societies. 41 
While like the communitarians, Kymlicka recognises the paradoxical gap 
between the theory and the practice of group rights in the liberal societies – on 
the one hand, group-differentiated practices exist in the liberal societies in 
various forms for the sake of pragmatism, on the other hand, liberalism does not 
recognise group rights at the normative level – and urged the normative 
incorporation of group rights, he does so essentially within the liberal 
framework.42 What makes Kymlicka different from a communitarian is his liberal 
justification for group-differentiated practices in liberal democracies with the 
central argument that depriving minorities of their rights will be a violation of 
the liberal principles of autonomy and equality. Conforming to the core of 
liberalism, he categorically claims in relation to the rights of ‘illiberal’ groups that 
minority rights are consistent with liberal culturalism if, first of all, “they protect 
the freedom of individuals within the group,” and secondly, “they promote 
relations of equality (non-dominance) between groups”.43 
However, this liberal shift, despite its promise for a better coherence with 
pragmatic needs and also practice, is often depicted as counter-productive for 
liberalism itself. The liberal theorist Chandran Kukathas, for example, dismantles 
the notion of cultural rights altogether.44 Despite his concerns for minority 
                                                          
40  Kymlicka defines national minorities as groups who formed functioning societies on 
their historical homelands prior to being incorporated into a larger state.   
41  Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995). See also, W Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: 
Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
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42  For a communitarian perspective on group rights, see, for example, Van Dyke, “The 
Individuals, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory,” 343–369; also Van 
Dyke, “Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought 
(1982),” 180–200. 
43  Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 22–23.  
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communities, he finds it unnecessary to abandon, modify, or reinterpret 
liberalism. According to him, the very emphasis of liberalism on individual 
rights and liberty reflects not hostility to the interests of communities but 
wariness of the power of the majority over minorities. Thus, there is no need to 
look for alternatives to liberalism or to throw away the individualism that lies at 
its heart. Therefore, unlike Kymlicka, he finds it unnecessary to accommodate 
any idea of group rights to address the issues of minority. To quote him: “We 
need, rather, to reassert the fundamental importance of individual liberty and 
individual rights and question the idea that cultural minorities have collective 
rights.”45 This proposition heavily depends on his assumption that the basis of 
collective rights is the rights of individuals. For Kukathas, while the interests 
given expression in groups do matter, they matter ultimately only to the extent 
that they affect actual individuals. Therefore, groups and communities have no 
special moral primacy in virtue of some natural priority.  
Solely relying on the primacy of individual’s choice, Kukathas contends that as 
long as individuals choose to remain with a group, liberal or illiberal, outside 
society is not entitled to intervene in the internal affairs of that group. In his 
words: “the primacy of freedom of association is all-important; it has to take 
priority over other liberties, such as those of speech or worship, which lies at the 
core of the liberal tradition.”46  Now, if membership in a cultural community is 
voluntary, and if the outside society has no right to intervene in the internal 
affairs of that community, it follows that to remain a member of that community, 
individuals must stick to the rules of that community. Kukathas believes that in 
this way some protection is given to the cultural communities through 
individualism without actually deviating from basic liberal principles. 
Another prominent liberal philosopher, Brian Barry, vehemently opposes the 
idea of promoting communal identities by the State although he recognises the 
role of communities and associations in human well-being. 47  He asserts that the 
fundamental liberal position on group rights is that individuals should be free to 
associate together in any way they like provided that their taking part in the 
activities of the group should come about as a result of their voluntary decision 
and they should be free to cease to take part whenever they want to.48 In this 
sense, he argues, there should not be any liberal protection of ‘group’ rights, for 
“[t]he only ways of life that need to appeal to the value of cultural diversity are 
those that necessarily involve unjust inequalities or require powers of 
indoctrination and control incompatible with liberalism in order to maintain 
                                                                                                                                                
Liberal Archipelago: a theory of diversity and freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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45  Ibid, 261. 
46  Ibid, 289. 
47 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 112–154. 
48  Ibid, 148. 
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themselves”.49 Given that such cultures are unfair and oppressive to at least some 
of their members, he finds it hard to see why they should be kept alive 
artificially, especially when he assumes that with embracing liberalism, groups 
will give up their demand for separate cultural rights.50 
That the State does not lend any special weight to the norms of illiberal – or 
liberal – groups, is, according to Barry, the essence of what it means to say that a 
society is a liberal society.51 It is, therefore, natural that Kymlicka’s emphasis on 
‘diversity’ and ‘autonomy’ for minorities came under his criticism; these notions 
refer to policies that would systematically undercut paradoxically those rights of 
individuals to protection against groups that the liberal States should guarantee. 
His crucial question thus follows: “How can a theory that would gut liberal 
principles be a form of liberalism?”52 A more candid expression comes from him 
when he claims: “If a liberal is not somebody who believes that liberalism is true 
(with or without inverted commas), what is a liberal?”53 And consequently he 
refuses to recognise Kymlicka as a liberal: 
A theory that has the implication that nationalities (whether they control 
a state or a sub-state polity) have a fundamental right to violate liberal 
principles is not a liberal theory of group rights. It is an illiberal theory 
with a bit of liberal hand-writing thrown in as an optional extra.54  
This controversy within liberalism apropos the accommodation of the 
conservative notion of group rights indicates that perhaps it would take a bit 
longer for this age-old controversy between liberal individualism and 
conservative collectivism to reach a subtle compromise keeping their core values 
intact. The case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh substantiates 
this proposition. 
The Case of the CHT 
According to Bangladesh’s now disputed 2011 census, of the country’s more than 
142 million inhabitants, just 1.2% are described as indigenous (adibashis).55 Most 
of them live in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), while some live in the so-called 
plains areas of Bangladesh and are more integrated into communities dominated 
by the majority Bangalis. More or less, there are thirteen indigenous communities 
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55  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, published on the IRIN 
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in the CHT (Rangamati, Bandarban and Khagrachari Hill Districts); they are: 
Chakma, Murma, Tangchangya, Tripura, Murang, Mrung, Bawm, Pangkhua, 
Lushai, Khumi, Khyang, Mru, and Sak.56 Yet, very recently, the Government of 
Bangladesh questioned the very indigenous character of the people living in the 
CHT. Briefing foreign diplomats and UN agencies in Dhaka on July 26, 2011, the 
Foreign Minister said that Bangladesh was concerned over attempts by some 
quarters at home and abroad to identify the ethnic minority groups as 
indigenous people in the CHT region.57 In her effort to clarify some ‘recent 
misconceptions’ about the identity of the people in the CHT, she claimed that 
people in the CHT were ‘ethnic minorities’ and they should not be called 
‘indigenous’. Given that neither Bangladesh Constitution nor any international 
law recognises these people as indigenous, she also urged the editors and senior 
journalists from print and electronic media to take note of it. She argued that the 
tribal people most certainly did not reside or exist in the CHT before the 16th 
century and were not considered ‘indigenous people’ in any historical reference 
books, memoirs or legal documents; rather, the CHT people were the late settlers 
on the Bengal soil and the CHT region compared to the Bangali native ethnic vast 
majority residing here for more than 4,000 years, she pointed out.58 While there is 
a series of studies either supporting or dismantling the indigenousness of the 
people in the CHT, this paper focuses on the official position of the government 
and exposes that the depiction of the CHT people as ‘ethnic minorities’ leaves 
them with no means of cultural protection within a legal architecture of human 
rights. Far from being peculiar to Bangladeshi national legal framework, this 
shortcoming is embedded in the liberal-individualist human rights regime that 
many postcolonial states unquestionably adopted in their constitutions as means 
of ‘progress’ and ‘universal civilisation’.     
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, drafted in light of 
liberal constitutionalism, guarantees equality. However, to address the de facto 
economic and social disparity, the Constitution permits affirmative actions “in 
favour of women or children or for the advancement of any backward section of 
citizens”.59 Special measures for indigenous peoples have been justified under 
this constitutional provision by putting them under the rubric of ‘backward 
section of citizens’. No doubt, centuries of systematic oppression and 
discrimination made the hill people vulnerable, and economic affirmative action 
is badly needed to ameliorate their economic status. But perceiving them as 
backward in terms of culture and tradition is nothing short of cultural hegemony 
by the dominant Bengali cultural group. 
It would be pertinent to mention here that during the British colonial rule, legal 
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58  Ibid. 
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measures were taken to protect the special characteristics of life and nature of the 
hill people of the CHT. The 1900 Regulation formulated by the British rulers is 
still considered the principal instrument for protecting hill people’s rights. 
Immediately after attaining independence from Pakistan in 1971, when the war-
ravaged Bangladesh Government was preparing to adopt a constitution, an 
indigenous peoples’ delegation led by Manobendra Narayan Larma called on 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman – the father of the nation – on February 
15, 1972 demanding autonomy for the CHT with its own legislature. But this 
demand was utterly rejected; he rather insisted that there could be only ‘one 
nation’ in Bangladesh. Bangabandhu therefore reportedly asked the hill people 
to forget their separate identity and “become Bengalis”.60  
After the brutal assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on August 15, 1975, 
martial law was imposed all over Bangladesh. During the regime of General 
Ziaur Rahman, the CHT Development Board headed by military personnel was 
formed in 1976. The Board undertook a devastating programme of settlement of 
hundreds of thousands of poor Bengali people in the CHT. From 1980 to 1984, as 
many as 400,000 Bengalis were made to settle in the CHT, and over 50,000 
Chakmas were reported to have fled to the Indian state of Tripura.61 In 1947, the 
Bengali population in the CHT was 2.5%. It rose to 10% in 1951 and 35% in 
1981.62 The Bengali population became almost 50% in 1991. In the Bandarban and 
Khagrachari hill districts, Bengalis are the majority where they account for 53 % 
and 52% of the total population respectively.63 
This effort of forced assimilation is not limited to demographic calculations only; 
hill people are being suppressed culturally as well. Bengali, the state language of 
the country, is used as the only language in the schools in the CHT. In this nation 
building process, a number of indigenous languages are being wiped out. 
Massacre of indigenous people, burning of their houses, arbitrary arrests, torture, 
extra-judicial executions and ‘disappearances’ reportedly perpetrated by or with 
the connivance of the military and law enforcement agencies during the years of 
armed conflict depict the human rights situation in the region.64 These were 
“planned actions as a part of macro objective of nation building through forced 
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assimilation and forced expulsion”.65  
On the other hand, Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS) – the major 
political representative of the indigenous communities in the CHT – through its 
ideological and organizational framework undertook to organise the hill people 
on a nationalistic agenda. The persecution in the CHT led to the demand by the 
PCJSS for a separate nationhood for the hill people. This party, formed in the 
wake of Bangabandhu’s refusal in 1972 to recognise the hill people as a 
community distinct from Bengalis, had since the mid 1980s been referring to the 
hill people as the ‘Jumma nation’.66  
With a view to realising Jumma nationalism by way of autonomy for the hill 
people, during the period of insurgency the PCJSS set out a number of demands: 
i) the Constitution of Bangladesh shall recognise the CHT as a special 
administrative unit, with regional autonomy. The three districts of the CHT shall 
be merged into one unit, and the region shall be renamed Jummaland; ii) 
Jummaland shall be administered by an autonomous Regional Council, which 
shall be elected directly by the people on the basis of adult franchise. The Council 
shall be responsible for 30 subjects including, inter alia, general administration, 
law and order, police, land, education, forestry, local government institutions, 
and cultural affairs; iii) all lands in the CHT, except some important government 
establishment, shall be placed under the jurisdiction of the Council. A 
constitutional ban ought to be put on the purchase of land in the CHT by 
‘outsiders’. Deeds made to lease out land to Bengalis for rubber plantation and 
forestry shall be cancelled and the lands shall be placed under the Council’s 
jurisdiction. The Constitution must ban Bengali settlements in the region. All 
‘outsiders’ who have settled in the area since August 17, 1947 shall be withdrawn 
from the region; iv) service rules shall be relaxed for the hill people. Special 
quotas shall be reserved in government civil services for the hill people; v) 
parliament seats of this constituency shall be reserved for the hill people only; vi) 
an autonomous indigenous Police Force constituting solely of the hill people 
shall be formed. Quotas should be reserved in the defence services for the hill 
people. The region shall be demilitarised; vii) a constitutional recognition shall be 
given to all the small nationalities of the area; and finally, viii) all international 
and internal Jumma refugees should be properly rehabilitated. Members of Santi 
Bahini (SB) – the military wing of the PCJSS – and all individuals who have been 
implicated for association with the SB should be properly rehabilitated.67 
The power-sharing demand of the PCJSS as a whole was perceived as a threat to 
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national security by military and conservative political elites. The political 
government in 1993 rejected the power-sharing demand by holding that 
“Bangladesh is an integrated and homogenous society bound by common 
language and rich cultural heritage. […] Bangladesh is a unitary state with a 
democratic Constitution that extends to the entire territory without exception”.68 
This official position perceives Bangladesh as a nation-state. By claiming 
Bangladesh a homogenous society, this position denies the existence of other 
cultural groups, and justifies various assimilative actions taken by successive 
governments. However, with the re-emergence of Awami League to power in 
1997, the government put efforts to bring an end to the insurgency by initiating 
dialogues with the PCJSS as well as by seeking cooperation from neighbouring 
India who allegedly provided the SB with arms and other supports during the 
whole period of the insurgency. This considerably influenced the PCJSS to soften 
its demand for regional autonomy; instead, during the negotiations with the 
government, it accepted the government position that the three hill districts of 
the CHT – Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Banderban – will form a regional 
council.69 Following closed-door negotiations, the CHT Peace Accord between 
the National Committee on CHT Affairs formed by the Government of the 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the PCJSS appeared on December 2, 1997.  
The Peace Accord responded, though half-heartedly, to the issues of local 
governance, rehabilitation, land, and general amnesty. The Accord provides for 
three Hill District Councils, wherein only the permanent residents of the CHT 
will be members.70 There is a provision for a Regional Council in coordination 
with these District Councils. The Chairman of this Council shall be elected 
indirectly by the elected members of the District Councils. The Regional Council 
shall be formed with 22 members of whom two-thirds will be elected from 
among the ‘tribals’. The Regional Council is given the responsibility of 
supervising and coordinating the subjects vested under the Hill District 
Councils. It is to be noted here that some major subjects like general 
administration and law and order, education, cultural affairs, information and 
statistics, population control and family planning that directly relate to 
autonomy and preserving indigenous culture were not vested under the Hill 
Districts. However, it was provided that the government and elected 
representatives shall make efforts to maintain separate cultures and traditions of 
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the ‘tribals’, and the government in order to develop the ‘tribal’ cultural activities 
at the national level shall provide necessary patronisation and assistance. 
Regarding pending land issues, the Accord stipulates that no land within the 
boundaries of Hill District shall be given in settlement, purchased, sold and 
transferred, including giving lease without prior approval of the Council. Some 
government establishments are kept outside this restriction. The Accord also 
prohibits any acquisition and transfer of land within the boundaries of the Hill 
District by the government without consultation and consent of the Hill District 
Council. Provisions for rehabilitation, amnesty along with compensation were 
made in the Peace Accord. 
However, to the dissatisfaction of the hill people, the Accord remained silent 
apropos their constitutional recognition. Instead, the term ‘tribal’ (the Bengali 
version of this word – Upajati – means sub-nation) was used to describe the 
indigenous peoples. The preamble to the Accord categorically mentions that the 
parties of this Accord arrived on an agreement “under the framework of the 
constitution of Bangladesh”. Besides, special arrangements to facilitate political 
participation of hill peoples by restricting a number of human rights of majority 
Bengalis contradict a number of fundamental rights guaranteed to all citizens of 
the country. On April 12-13, 2010, the High Court Division declared illegal some 
important sections of the ‘Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council Act’, and 
found the Accord, though a political issue, a violation of the spirit of the 
Constitution following two separate writ petitions.71 Later, a seven-member full 
bench of the Appellate Division led by the then Chief Justice gave an order of 
stay on the HC verdict until the appeal was dissolved.  
Paradoxically, the legality of peace agreements under the constitution or 
international law is not usually the prime concern of various contending parties 
of conflicts. Often, such agreements are the products of grave pragmatic needs in 
the absence of any better option. The CHT Peace Accord of 1997 is not any 
exception here. In the face of insurgency and ensuing massive violation of 
human rights as well as various regional and international pressures on both the 
government and the PCJSS, such a peace accord was a demand of time. The 
peace process appeared complicated when the then opposition party vehemently 
opposed any concessions in favour of the indigenous people, as that would go 
against the unitary spirit of Bangladeshi nationalism as well as the territorial 
integrity of the country. The party in power at that time also consistently 
emphasized the nation-state character of Bangladesh. Therefore, the CHT Peace 
Accord mainly concentrated on bringing an end to insurgency by devolving a 
few number of local governments, subject to newly established district and 
regional councils and rehabilitating the members of the Santi Bahini (SB) without 
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addressing the key issue of the conflict. Yet, right-wing political parties vowed to 
repeal it once they assumed power, which they actually did not – again for 
pragmatic reasons. On the other hand, a section of hill people too rejected the 
accord as a compromise and formed a political party – United Peoples 
Democratic Front (UPDF) – to carry on the struggle for the ‘full autonomy’ of the 
CHT.72 Under such delicate circumstances, no substantive progress has been 
made in the implementation of the Accord. 
Conclusion 
This brief account of the interaction between the dominant majority culture and 
the ethnic minorities against the backdrop of the liberal individualism highlights 
the inherent complexities that the projection of the liberal perception of ethnicity 
on the periphery engenders. This narrative also brings forth the issue of 
normative compatibility of current liberal legal norms with an effective response 
to ethnic conflicts that requires ethnic accommodation along ethnic lines in one 
form or the other.73 This gap between the normative stance and pragmatic needs 
implies that international law, with its normative reliance on liberal 
individualism, deals with ethnic conflicts in a ‘quasi-legal’ realm.  
                                                          
72  Mohsin, Politics of Nationalism, 215. 
73  To explain the limitation of the liberal individualist approach to ethnic conflicts, Koshy 
describes the proceedings involving the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict before the Human 
Rights Commission and the Sub-Commission in which almost exclusive attention was 
given to the violations of core individual rights rather than to the ethnic and political 
structures giving rise to the conflict as such or to the related claims of some Tamil 
groups for an autonomy scheme. See, Ninan Koshy, “Ethnic Conflicts in Sri Lanka and 
the UN Human Rights System,” in Ethnic Conflicts and the UN Human Rights System, 
ed. Henry J Steiner, cited in Henry J Steiner, “Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle 
over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities,” Notre Dame Law Review 66 (1991), fn 33. 
Similarly, in the context of Nigeria, Osaghae registers his distrust of individualist 
human rights as the sole system to address ethnic conflicts, and argues that although 
individual rights are necessary, group rights which “regard ethnic groups as 
deserving of protection of justice in competition with others are also needed” for 
ethnic conflict management. See, Eghosa E Osaghae, “Human Rights and Ethnic 
Conflict Management: The Case of Nigeria,” Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 2 (1996): 
171. Lacking these rights, he asserts, the continued existence of ethnic groups cannot 
be guaranteed, nor can their non-subjugation by other groups be prevented, in that the 
entrenchment of individual rights alone cannot serve the purposes which group rights 
are meant to serve (178). Using the example of ethnic tension in Nigeria, Osaghae thus 
concludes that there are important ethnic group interests which cannot be served by 
individual rights; at least some fundamental group rights such as the rights of the 
ethnic group to exist, to preserve and protect its language and culture, and to 
participate equally with others in the affairs of the State, including the sharing of 
power and resources, have to be recognised, which would then become “a meaningful 
basis for trying to redress the imbalances and inequalities among the various groups” 
(186). This claim is equally true for other conflict situations as well. 
Liberal Self-determination, Post-colonial Statehood, and Minorities 
97 
What is the way forward then? The shortcoming of liberal international law in 
accommodating the conservative ethnic phenomenon within its individualist 
framework is inherent, and therefore, demands a drastic remodelling of the 
normative relationship between ethnicity and international law. One prudent 
way of doing this is to rethink liberalism itself. Since international law is shaped 
by the dominant political philosophy of each epoch, the normative 
accommodation of ethnicity within liberalism is naturally expected to reorganise 
the normative foundation of international law vis-à-vis ethnicity.  
